Security administration is harder in databases that have multiple tiers of derived data, such as federations, warehouses, or systems with many views. Metadata (e.g., security requirements) expressed at each tier must be visible and understood at the other tier. We describe several use cases in which tiers negotiate to reconcile their business requirements. The sources must grant enough privileges for the derived tier to support the applications; the derived tier must enforce enough restrictions so that the sources' concerns are met; and the relationship between the privileges at source and derived tier must be visible and auditable.
Introduction
Federations and warehouses [Osz, Inm] are examples of multi-tier database systems. Data originates in a source tier. The derived tier consists of information derived from the sources. The system should have an integrated security policy, so that each granule of data is protected consistently, whether obtained through the source or derived tier. Creating such a policy requires negotiations between administrators at different tiers.
The goal of this paper is to alert the security community to the administration problems in such multi-tier systems, and to suggest a model within which the necessary research can be done. We present motivating scenarios, and give initial sketches of the necessary theory, methodologies and automated tool support. The metadata management problem for warehouses and federations is broad and murky. Our main contribution is to formulate a problem that can be fruitfully addressed both by tool vendors and by researchers.
The Need for Collaboration
The tiers in a multi-tier database are often administered separately, which makes security administration harder than in a centralized system. Administrative activities at one tier may affect other tiers, and thus need to be visible and understood at these tiers. For example, if a source tier grants or revokes the access permissions on one of its tables, it must communicate this to derived tiers that use that table.
2 Similarly, if a derived tier wishes to give a particular subject (e.g., user, role, group) access to one of its tables, it must request permission from the (source tier) owners of information used to derived the table, in terms of each owner's schemas.
The administrators of each tier must be able to negotiate with each other, in order to match security and business requirements. In particular, negotiation aims at:
• Protecting information, as its owners require.
• Giving sufficient access permissions so applications can accomplish their tasks.
• Enforcing the agreed-upon access policies as efficiently and reliably as possible.
• Allowing administrators at different tiers to understand each other's concerns, without needing to understand each other's schema and the derivation logic.
Source versus Derived Permissions
Administrators need to see all relevant security metadata, whether initially provided in terms of their "native" schema or a foreign schema. To enable this visibility, negotiation support must include a translation step. We sketch the theory here, and revisit in more detail in section 3.
Current multi-tier systems do not really connect the source-tier and derived-tier permissions. For example in a federation, a middleware product (as the owner of federation views) may be given unlimited Read access to sources, with Grant option. This approach places great burdens and trust on the federation administrator, but provides neither guidance nor tools. In particular, there is no formal basis for source administrators to judge whether the permissions that the federation administrator grants are appropriate.
Our approach is based on three premises:
1. Ownership and access controls are fundamentally about information, not physical artifacts (source tables) or interfaces (views). That is, protection must be global. This implies that access controls asserted at one schema must be propagated to the other schemas. 3. Administrators of implementation units (source tables, views, replicas) may reduce the permissions allowed by (2), but not expand them. These restrictions often stem from a desire to control physical resources. To protect response times or generate revenues, one database might access only by known subscribers. To reduce hacker threats, another might allow access only by the enterprise's employees.
These premises guarantee that the access permissions in a database are consistent. That is, if a user has access to information in one part of the database, the user has access to that information everywhere in the database. Section 3.6 discusses a mechanism for superimposing local restrictions.
Assumptions and Simplifications
Our work does not address the usual problems of integrating distributed heterogeneous data, nor deal with all aspects of security for an enterprise database. We assume that a metadata management environment (denoted MME), provides the illusion of several kinds of uniformity:
• Schemas, metadata, and distributed databases: The source and view schemas and their metadata are represented in a repository. All schemas and views are in the same language (e.g., SQL).
• Permission types: MME defines a uniform set of permission types (e.g., Create, Read, Update, Delete), across all tiers.
• Subjects to whom privileges are granted: MME manages grants of access permissions to subjects (e.g., users or roles) that are globally known across tiers. Authentication, management of role membership, and subject globalization (i.e., specifying which global subject corresponds to each DBMS or operating system subject) are outside our scope.
Some further assumptions simplify our prose. We believe that each of them could easily be removed, as indicated:
• We speak in terms of only two tiers -a source tier and a derived tier -so each administrator sees just one "foreign" tier. (Actually, the derivation graph can be arbitrary.)
• We assume that view definitions are readable by all users (rather than being protected objects).
• We ignore delays in propagating data and metadata updates.
• We do not model Grants of Grant authority. Instead, we merely speak of owners of information. An owner can work in terms of source tables (the usual case) or view tables 3 (e.g., if the sources are merely an efficient physical representation of a natural conceptual table).
Federations and warehouses bring together a great deal of information, increasing the aggregation vulnerabilities: Information that in isolation was not sensitive can become sensitive when made accessible together, e.g., via a federation [Jaj, Thu]. However, the proposed solutions to this problem for centralized systems seem to provide modest extra security, at very high cost in run-time and administration (e.g., quadratic growth). We therefore do not address this issue.
Paper Roadmap
Section 2 covers the kinds of negotiation that are possible between the source and derived tiers. In it, we show that communication can be split into a requested action and a translation of permissions from one schema to another. Section 3 examines the underlying theory that allows this translation to proceed. Section 4 discusses conclusions and suggests promising open research problems.
Negotiation Scenarios
The tiers in a multi-tier database may be administered separately, with conflicting goals. This section illustrates the kinds of negotiations that must be performed, and implicitly the kinds of capabilities a metadata coordination tool must provide. Its research contribution is to identify, from the overwhelming set of real requirements, scenarios that point at useful, feasible facilities for permission negotiation and translation. In particular, we try to answer:
• What sort of negotiations do the tiers' administrators need to perform?
• What sorts of requests do they need to send to each other? There appear to be a mix of commands, proposals, notifications, and comparisons.
• How are requests for permissions translated to the recipients' schemas? Each party needs to know what has been said, in terms of its own schema.
Many tasks involve a set of permissions against the requestor's schema, a target schema, a recipient for the permissions (translated to refer to the target schema), and a desired action. The action 4 may be a command to install the translated permissions ("Enforce these permissions at your tier."), a proposal ("I would like you to cause these permissions to be true."), a description of what the tier is doing ("For your information: Here are the permissions I enforce."), or a hypothetical display ("If I granted these permissions, how would it look on the target schema?")
The scenarios below present more detail. The first view is a selection from PROCEDURE; the second joins PATIENT and PROCEDURE, and then groups by Insurance_Co and (Month, Year) from Date, and totals the Bill_Amount.
Bottom-Up: Conforming to implied permissions
In the first scenario, the view tier is a data warehouse over the Hospital database. Derived tables are materialized views, whose derivation may involve complex fusion and scrubbing logic. The warehouse handles user requests without referring back to sources, and hence checks all permissions itself. The warehouse's permissions should conform to the source's intentions.
The source tier keeps the warehouse informed about what access permissions to enforce. Whenever a grant or revoke command occurs at the source, the metadata management environment transmits the command to the warehouse, and translates the source's command to an appropriate action on the appropriate view tables. For example, a grant on PROCEDURE translates to a grant on DOCTOR_ACTIVITY and, if there is an existing corresponding grant on PATIENT, a grant on INSURANCE.
Automated translation is crucial, both to reduce administrator workload and to keep the system secure in a dynamic environment. When a source revokes a permission, the warehouse should immediately reflect the revocation. A message expressed in terms of source tables will be unintelligible to installer scripts at the warehouse DBMS. Even human administrators will react slowly and unreliably when presented with changes in terms of another tier's tables.
In the second scenario, the derived tier is a federated database. Permissions are asserted against source schemas, and enforcement occurs after the user's query is translated to a query on source tables. The system can execute without translating permissions to refer to derived tables. But derived tier users want to use their own tables when inspecting the permissions that they possess, or when they have been refused access. Consequently, the source administrator should transmit grant and revoke permissions to the derived tier, as in scenario 1.
In the general case, some views may be derivable from other views. In such cases, permissions on the lower views will also need to propagate upward.
Our example views are simpler than the general case, but we believe such simplicity occurs often in real life. Even complex derivations often return some attributes that were simply pulled from source tables. For the remaining cases, we contend that an administrator's assistant need not be complete to be useful. In fact, it may be very helpful for researchers to point out and formalize easy cases, where there can be substantial benefit at little cost.
Top-Down: Proposing new permissions
This scenario applies to either the warehouse or federation examples above. Suppose the derived tier administrator proposes an increase in her users' permissions. For example, suppose cost analysts need to be able to read the INSURANCE table. The derived tier administrator sends a message to the source tier requesting this change.
The system executes this message as follows. The first step is to compare the desired and existing permissions on the derived tables, so that only the additional (delta) permissions will be requested. There should be less work in judging the delta, and we avoid redundant grants that invite confusion when privileges are revoked. In the example, suppose costAnalyst already has access to PROCEDURE, and requests access to view INSURANCE. When the request is translated to the sources, one would ask for a new Grant only on PATIENT. In systems with column permissions, one might determine that Analyst already had permission to read the first three INSURANCE columns, so the downward translation consists of a request for access only to INSURANCE.Billed_Amount.
At this point, the source administrator has several options. If she is willing to make the change, agreement has been reached. Or she may instead make a counterproposal. The counteroffer is translated in "bottomup" mode to the derived tier administrator, who again may agree, or continue the negotiation.
A counterproposal may take several forms. The administrator may propose a different user (e.g. "costAnalystSupervisor") be assigned the desired permissions. Or the two administrators might jointly determine that a new user role is required.
Alternatively, the administrator may propose to create one or more views that are useful in answering derived tier queries, but are less sensitive than the underlying tables [Sto75] . For example, given a request for cost analyst access to the PATIENT table, the source administrator may counter-propose that cost analysts be given access to a view that contains only those patients who were seen this year. Or the source administrator, feeling that Patient_Id values must be kept confidential, gives analysts access to a view that is the join of PATIENT and PROCEDURE, projecting out the Patient_Id. The view query for INSURANCE can be rewritten to employ that view instead.
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Finally, we note that it may be useful for the source to grant a wider set of permissions than were requested. For example, suppose the derived tier administrator requests that cost analysts be given access to: Select Procedure_Performed, Bill_Amount From PATIENT Where Year > 1996
The source administrator determines that this information is suitable for cost analysts to see, and therefore is willing to create a view for it. However, the administrator realizes that other fields are equally releasable (e.g., Doctor, Date), as are pre-1996 records. Furthermore, it is likely that cost analysts will later want to see other fields or selection criteria. Hence, the source administrator chooses to define and grant Read access to the following wider view: Select Procedure_Performed, Bill_Amount, Doctor, Date From PATIENT Expanding the view contravenes the principle of least privilege, but may reduce the administrator's workload substantially.
In the above scenarios, the source had ultimate control over permissions. Our approach also accommodates scenarios where the security officer works in terms of the view schema. For example, often a conceptual object (e.g., HOSPITAL) is partitioned and denormalized for efficiency, and expressed as a view. The physical tables represent no natural application unit. For administering information security, the HOSPITAL view may be a more natural venue..
Comparison: Check the consistency of the two tiers
If all tiers faithfully imposed the information owners' permissions, the permissions would all be consistent. This is not how systems are administered today. For example, suppose information owners use just the source schema to express permissions, and consider a warehouse that enforces permissions on queries against the (derived) warehouse schema. Auditors may want to check whether all permissions granted on the warehouse can be inferred from the source permissions. If not, there may be a serious security violation.
Today, such checks are so troublesome that they are rarely done. With automated comparisons, one could do a nightly consistency check on critical information.
All of these comparisons require that permissions be expressed in terms of the same schema. One can translate source permissions upward, to refer to the derived schema. These are easily compared with the permissions actually granted by a warehouse. The resulting exception report identifies both warehouse permissions that were not justified by sources, and source permissions that the warehouse has chosen not to grant. If desired, the exception report can be treated as a proposal, to be propagated downward (as discussed in section 2.2).
Pointers to Additional Material:
A mockup demonstration of elementary negotiation and translation is available on the web pages [Ros99b] . An interface mockup shows administrators communicating proposed metadata changes upwards and downwards. It also shows the rules for translating permissions (and some other kinds of metadata) to refer to the other tier's schema, and the management of these translation rules. A paper describing more sophisticated negotiation support is also available there. Frameworks for building and extending such tools are discussed in [Ros98, Ros99a] .
Handling Access Control Metadata
The scenarios above illustrated database administrator's requirements in a multi-tier database, especially for negotiations. This section focuses on the model of permissions, and their translation (i.e., inference) across tiers. To encourage vendors to move the results into product, we seek broad applicability but simple implementation.
Preliminaries
Access permissions are associated with source or view tables in a schema. There are two popular ways of representing a table's access permissions: as a set of Access Control Lists (i.e., {subjects with a given permission}), or as a single access predicate. A predicate formalism is more flexible (it lets us include other tests, e.g., on time-of-day or user's department) and has a solid base in logic. The ACL notation is more intuitive for Granting and Revoking. We use access predicates, but the same results hold for ACLs.
Formally, the expression Grant(T, p) denotes that if predicate p is satisfied, one can access table T 6 . A table can have any number of such access permissions with "OR" semantics, e.g., from separate SQL Grant operations.
We separate a table's permissions into • Information permissions: Here, the information's owner wishes to impose controls on all routes through which a particular kind of information (e.g., patients' names) can be accessed. From this information policy, one derives permissions to be allowed on each table.
• Physical resource permissions: Permissions that are associated with concrete processing resources (e.g., physical tables, interfaces with executable code). These allow administrators to deal with local requirements for system security, performance, or payment.
To access information from a table, one needs both the information and the physical resource permissions. Administrators working with derived tables will need answers about both, e.g., "Are cost-analysts allowed to read patient names" and "Will some system that possesses patient names allow me to run my queries?" The two properties are likely to be administered separately. Information permissions are discussed in sections 3.1-3.4, and physical resources in 3.5.
Inferring Access Permissions
Given a (base or derived) table T, the following rules define the inferred permissions associated with T. The first two rules are straightforward. The first rule states that a permission on T can be either directly asserted or inferred. The second rule formalizes the idea (from section 3.1) that the meaning of multiple direct assertions is the same as the OR of the individual predicates.
The last two rules go together, to say that you get access permission on a If a user has an access permission on both V1 and V2, then this same permission can be inferred for PROCEDURE.
The key concept in the above rules is: Any query that can compute T can be used to infer permissions on T. This of course begs the question of how such queries can be found. This issue is sufficiently important that we devote Section 3.3 to it.
Our approach also handles update operations on views, whose implementation is expressed as a sequence of source-table operations. 7 In all cases, the view update is replaced by a sequence of database operations (i.e., a procedure) that carries out the desired update. We can easily adapt the inference rules to such situations, by replacing "T can be computed by query Qi" with "T can be implemented by a procedure Pi".
Note that the generated operations need not all be the same flavor as the original. For example, a request to delete from a join view V = R1 join R2 join R3 might translate to "Delete from R1; Delete from R2; Read R3 to check integrity, and Abort if violated". The access permission for the view update is the AND of permissions for the two Deletions and the Read.
7 Current database tools (e.g., Oracle's CASE product) handle many cases of view update, with a variety of mechanisms. Depending on tools and performance issues, the desired semantics can be specified as a stored procedure or method, as a trigger, or as a metadata-driven request translator in the development environment or user interface. Triggered updates may execute under the definer's permissions, which can be checked when the trigger is compiled.
Imperfect Solutions to the Inference / Rewrite Problem
The inference rules of Section 3.2 define the allowable access permissions on a table T by referring to the set of all queries that can compute T. But this set may be neither robust (e.g., new types of integrity constraints will require more powerful inference), nor feasible to enumerate.
Our approach is to recognize that the inference rules can be understood both theoretically and pragmatically. The theoretical mode considers the set of all queries that are mathematically equivalent. The pragmatic mode considers the set of equivalent queries the system finds feasible to generate.
The theoretical mode is sound (in the sense of allowing only rewrite-justified permissions) and complete (since by definition, it considers all rewrites). But it is no basis for building a system. If the constraint theory is rich, the problem of finding all queries equivalent to some Q is undecidable; at intermediate richness, it still may be computationally prohibitive. Also, completeness is fragile as systems evolve-if one introduces a new type of constraint, the rewrite process may no longer be complete.
The pragmatic mode is sound 8 , but not complete. A pragmatic access-permission checker does its best to identify a rewrite that enables the query to execute, but does not guarantee to find it. It dodges both the semantic and exponential-growth problems. We argue that pragmatic mode is the right basis for building a system. There is ample precedent for DBMS facilities that are sound but may fail. For example, some SQL queries will timeout or crash due to huge temporaries -thus the set of executable queries depends on the cleverness of the query processor.
The difference between theoretical and pragmatic mode only involves inferred permissions. The pragmatic mode would begin with the explicit permissions (rules 1 and 2), and then heuristically infer additional ones; hence it gives at least the permissions of current SQL systems. Any additional inferred permissions can be considered a convenience to the user. And a user who is cleverer than the automated search can do the replacement manually.
A final advantage of our approach is that we can take advantage of query-processing technology. Query processors are a critical, large (> 100K lines of code) well-funded part of DBMS implementations. By using the rewrite set generated by the query processor, the security subsystem can improve as the query optimizer improves.
Exploiting Rewrites
This section explores the use of query rewrite in security semantics.
View Substitution
View substitution is the process of replacing a mention of a view in a query by the view's definition [Sto75] . Our approach gives the option of view definition without separate security administration. To users who have the necessary permissions on the source tables, the view is simply an alternate interface with no security ramifications. In contrast, the current SQL standard requires that view users obtain explicit grants from the view owner.
We recognize that sometimes executing a view query Q V (T 1 , …,T n ) adds knowledge, making the result more sensitive than its inputs 9 . We cannot solve the entire aggregation problem, but can protect knowledge embodied in the view definition. This requires no change to our model -one simply protects the view text and (possibly with looser permissions) its executable.
Constraint-based Simplifications
If the user queries a derived table V, some source data that underlies V may be irrelevant to the query result. Query processors routinely exploit integrity constraints and relational algebra to rewrite queries in a simpler form. In terms of our inference rules, a query needs only permissions for the data it accesses (using the simplified expression). Such inference can substantially increase the set of view queries that users are allowed to execute.
The following example illustrates the benefit. Suppose the source database has a foreign key constraint on Patient_Id (i.e., every record in PROCEDURE has a unique corresponding PATIENT). Suppose also that the derived tier contains a table that is the join of the two source tables, as in:
Create If one could define methods, one could get by with even less access. Frequently a company will allow outsiders to request a single phone number, but not to download a telephone directory. Analogously, we don't need full permissions on the PROCEDURE table; we just need to know whether a given patient appears in the table. (Oracle's "reference" privilege is somewhat similar, but executes under the constraint-definer's privileges). Let isPresent(value, column) denote a method that returns TRUE if the value appears in the specified column. Query Q2 could then be rewritten as:
Select Insurance_Co From PATIENT Where isPresent(Patient_Id, PROCEDURE.Patient_Id)
Rewrite in terms of other views
A source tier can use views to provide redundant interfaces to its data. The same information might be available through a source table and through a view, and both may be available for queries. This means that there can be many ways to rewrite a query in equivalent form. In particular, many databases (e.g., warehouses) include materialized views, and query optimizers are beginning speed execution by rewriting queries to use them. These techniques can be used to find additional access permissions. The fact that this rewriting exists means that a user can execute Q2 if she has access permission on PATIENT and PUB_PROCEDURE. It may not mean, however, that Q2 will be executed this way. Once the system has established that the user has permission to execute the query, it may execute it any way it chooses. The chosen execution strategy may involve accessing tables (such as PROCEDURE) that are not available to the user, but improve execution efficiency. The system can guarantee that the user will see only information she is allowed to see.
Physical Resource Permissions
Thus far, we have been concerned about permissions on information, applicable wherever the information resides. We anticipate that most enterprises will allow physical system owners to further restrict who may use their resources. Motivations include financial (only those who pay), workload management, and security (high security machines that contain copies of public information do not invite the public in).
For example, suppose that the CustomerService department of a company has gathered a great deal of customer information, and imposed appropriate access predicates to protect confidentiality. Basic information (name, address) is already widely used (e.g., by Shipping), but other departments want more. Top management has declared the information to be an enterprise resource (subject to confidentiality). But CustomerService argues that its server will be swamped, and it lacks hardware and personnel to run a larger operation.
The impasse is resolved when CustomerService restricts machine access to a role Subscriber, whose members have agreed to pay a fee for each access to this Customer information. Information permissions are checked separately (e.g., Shipping should not be allowed to see the customer's payment record). CreditDecisions, which makes limited use of the data, pays a charge for each customer it examines. Marketing, which wants heavy usage, makes the marketing DBA a subscriber. She downloads weekly to the marketing server.
In order to support such scenarios, we allow administrators to specify physical resource permissions on stored tables. For example, multiple machines might maintain copies of the same data, for different user sets. Physical resource permissions determine whether the execution strategy may use a physical resource, i.e., a stored table or (in OO systems, a server).
The declaration GrantPhys(T,p) specifies that physical resource permission p is enabled on stored table T (a source or a materialized view). The execution strategy must be expressed in terms of stored tables for which the user received such explicit allowances. Inference calculates whether some rewrite can provide sufficient physical resources. An administration tool may help relate the two kinds of permissions, e.g., to identify information permissions that have no physical resources to satisfy them. (It is useful to allow such orphans, rather than require information policy makers to deal immediately with physical resources.)
Physical resource permissions are inferred using rules analogous to those of Section 3.2, but with each permission set suffixed _Phys. Thus each table T (stored or view) has two inferred sets of permissions. Its information permissions specify who is allowed to access T; its local resource permissions specify who will be physically able to calculate T, based on enabled access to underlying tables. A user can access a table only if she has both kinds of permissions on it.
Determining Enforcement Strategies
Federations, warehouses, and centralized DBMSs' views differ in where one tests permissions. Warehouse queries never reach the sources, so permissions must be checked at the warehouse. A centralized DBMS often tests permissions at compile time.
Federations have greater flexibility, assuming that all tiers know the requestor's identity. 10 Enforcement at the sources gives the data providers higher assurance because the federation need not be trusted. Enforcement at the derived tier tends to be more responsive and intelligible to users. Enforcing at both tiers would combine both advantages, and may be cheap (especially if done largely at compile time).
In an ideal world, these distinctions would not concern business decision-makers. Instead, the business decision would specify requirements for assurance and responsiveness, and a tool (or an always-available technical expert) would determine what access controls each tier enforced.
Conclusions and Open Questions / Research Issues

What We have Accomplished
Several important classes of systems (federations, warehouses, conceptual views) can be described as "multi-tier databases". Current metadata management tools offer little help in coordinating any but the most basic metadata (e.g., tables and their attributes). As a consequence, metadata is frequently absent or inconsistent, causing security vulnerabilities on one hand, and on the other, inadequate accessibility.
Our scenarios illustrated practical requirements for managing security metadata in such environments. We showed the need for communicating access permissions between different tiers in the database. We also illustrated the need for comparison capabilities, both for ordinary administration and for auditing. The scenarios further illustrated extra permissions granted when a view has filtered or summarized information.
We then sketched a technical foundation for coordinating access permissions. The key innovations that helped us simplify the model were to:
• Base the theory on query rewrite, rather than building a more complex theory of permission inference.
• Specify the global information permissions separately from local resource controls. Each has a strong inference rule, and the desired behavior is obtained as their intersection. A series of examples showed how query rewrites permitted additional access. We then used the same theory to handle non-Read operations, and other granularities.
The theory in the paper is neither startling nor complex. Paradoxically, this is one of the key strengths of the paper. The security administration problem for warehouses and federations is broad and murky. We have identified a problem whose solution can give significant practical benefit, and can be implemented using relatively simple theory.
Technology Insertion Issues
It seems quite feasible to add metadata-propagation (e.g., for access permissions) to existing schemamanagement environments (for federations and warehouses). If we could automate coordination of, say, 50% of the metadata, we could make federation and warehouse administration cheaper and more effective. We believe that metadata propagation capabilities would be an excellent addition to a vendor's tool suite. Reference [Ros98b] shows how such a tool might look.
Security administration seems a good place to begin metadata propagation tools. Security is mandatory. In contrast, it is harder to provide strong incentives for data quality and many other forms of metadata.
Perhaps the biggest technical challenge is to exploit rather than rebuild query rewrite technology, in generating propagation rules. First, query rewrite techniques require that derivations be understandable, e.g., be in SQL and definitely not in Java. Second, we want to be able to submit a query for rewrite but not execution.
Open Research Problems
The multi-tier paradigm opens many questions for security and other research. The issues in section 4.2 apply to many kinds of metadata. The discussion below focuses on access permissions. First, we need a strategy for dealing with different permission granularities. Some organizations or DBMSs may permit multiple granularities simultaneously, while others will insist on a favored one.
Second, once the policy is known, administrators need help in devising an enforcement strategy. The software used at the different tiers may differ in flexibility, assurance, and granularity.
Third, we need a theory of permission deltas. Even a single table can involve an intimidating amount of metadata. We want the ability to propose a small change, and have just the small change be seen at other tiers. Also, when a view's users want more permissions than the view offers, we need algorithms that generate a minimal view on which one can assert the additional permissions.
Fourth, SQL's access controls on views are too inflexible to apply to federations. They require that each view definer be trusted by owners of source tables, and be willing to act as security administrator. And they don't allow the separate administration of local physical resources. As much as possible, we would like to see a federation or data warehousing system as an integrated database. Since SQL dominates relational databases, we want to integrate our approach with SQL security capabilities.
Fifth, we intend to investigate the possibility of security components. Enterprise Java Beans controls transaction behavior via property sheets; perhaps a similar approach would work here.
Sixth, the essence of our approach is to use some simple principles to propagate security metadata between the tiers. We believe that it would be fruitful to apply a similar approach to other forms of metadata. For non-security issues, the chief problems are to devise:
• theory for propagating other kinds of metadata (e.g., data pedigree, credibility, precision, timeliness), through a wide set of query operators (e.g., outerjoin, pivot); • a component framework that allows administrators to incrementally insert and customize the everincreasing set of propagation rules [Ros99a] .
